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Abstract
The shallow phenomenon of moral performativity is consistently prevalent from the abolitionist
movement of the eighteenth-century, to the Black Lives Matter movement of the twenty-firstcentury. Olaudah Equiano’s extraordinary abolitionist text, The Interesting Narrative of the Life
of Olaudah Equiano, investigates and utilizes this phenomenon as he offers readers across
centuries the opportunity to recognize the tenacious inequality which Black people face, as well
as the paradoxical value that moral performativity provides. Through a close reading of
Equiano’s religious argument, as well as his sentimental family scene, it may be recognized how
egoism has the potential to unite with sentimentalism, and thus, may result in profound affective
responses that lead to public displays of support among audiences. In the context of Equiano’s
narrative, this essay deconstructs and compares eighteenth-century and contemporary moral
ideologies and egoism in relation to social injustice. Further, this essay contemplates the
perpetual racist misconstructions concerning Black affect, and the selfish incentives that may
function to obstruct social progress. Predominantly, in this essay, I ponder whether audience
engagement in moral performativity may alter social norms surrounding racial inequality, and
thereby, successfully advance pertinent anti-racism movements.
187 words.
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Moral Performativity in Eighteenth-Century Abolitionism and Black Lives Matter
Olaudah Equiano’s 1789 text, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano,
presents a compelling argument for mobilizing anti-racist discourse through humanizing Black
people. Equiano’s narrative is structured in a way that is intended to engage readers through
exerting a variety of arguments while recollecting events from the perspective of a judicious exslave. This tactic is useful, as it functions to encourage readers to inhabit the position of the
oppressed Black slave. Thus, readers are forced either to proceed empathetically, or negate his
profusion of arguments and compromise their own morality. Consequently, in convincing nonBlack people (predominantly white people who have no personal experience with racial
oppression) of the importance of anti-racist behaviour, Black writers such as Equiano are forced
to appeal to the inherently skeptical or selfish motivators behind anti-racist discourse. This
forced abolitionist writers, like Equiano, to relay their stories in order to appeal to white
European “men [who] would concentrate on rational and legal arguments…[and] women [who]
would be left to dwell on "sentimental" scenes of family separation” (Costanzo 24). More
recently, a common impulsion for non-Black involvement in the Black Lives Matter movement
similarly depends on virtue signaling, in which “moral claims are driven by a desire for status
rather than a desire for truth” (Westra 4), which is generally incentivized by specific incidents of
racial injustice. Even so, through appealing to white readers’ selfish values, the goal of
accentuating racial injustice is to “engage the reader’s pity and spur political action” (Ahern 2),
despite the shallowness of audience motivations. Still, the support of anti-racist endeavours, by
non-Black people, for selfishly performative reasons seems inherently harmful. As Stephen
Ahern notes, shallow performativity may function to sustain white misunderstanding of Black
affective responses to unfathomable instances of injustice by “ignoring the contexts of suffering,
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and thereby opening no avenues for lasting relief… [and it] can be actively harmful, by
reinforcing stereotypes” (2). Therefore, it may conceal the depth of racial inequality throughout
history, effectively making people complacent with racist ideals. Nonetheless, in having readers
inhabit the position of the racially-oppressed individual, eighteenth-century authors such as
Equiano introduce white readers to several astute arguments surrounding undeniable racial
injustice. Whether people genuinely empathize or whether they prioritize their own egoism, the
subsequent moral performativity may redefine social norms by coercing generally unperturbed
people into recognizing and normalizing Black affective agency and endorsing racial justice.
A common ground between eighteenth and twenty-first century readers is that individuals
tend to prefer to think highly of their own rationality and morality, so that they may seem
appealing to social groups. People tend to “conform to normative social practices because we are
motivated by our beliefs about what other people do and think about those practices, not what we
ourselves think about them” (Westra 6), which indicates the selfish incentives for maintaining a
publicly high moral stance in response to racial injustices. For eighteenth-century readers, the
morally-sound public persona would have likely revolved around affective piety, which is a form
of piety linking religious virtue to empathetic connection. Contemporary morality, on the other
hand, seemingly revolves around the appearance of adhering to notions regarding a variety of
normalized social justice movements. While many contemporary readers are likely to be less
religious than the typical eighteenth-century reader, Equiano’s focus on affective piety may
appeal to readers across centuries. In compelling readers to accept rational arguments that are
submerged in the emotional situation of a suffering individual, Equiano’s narrative can appeal to
personal and communal values and therefore, “make real a problem that afflicted a whole
population, by allowing the reader to visualize the scene of suffering and engage in imaginative
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identification with the plight of the victim" (Ahern 6). Hence, affect may break through white
resistance to rational arguments in favour of abolitionism. So, affective agency, or the ability to
feel and exert emotions, as well as the ability to link affect to action (in which people may feel
emotionally moved and therefore, compelled to physically do something), works together with
egoism in motivating individuals to support normalized social justice movements. Further, virtue
signaling is convenient in maintaining a moral public persona for audiences who need not put
genuine effort forth, aside from a public display of discontent with injustices, as, “the primary
intention of any act of virtue signaling is to convey information about the speaker” (Westra 9).
So, disingenuous audiences across centuries may perform virtue signaling or a morally enhanced
public persona through simply articulating discontent, which has the potential to alert a more
genuine audience who may opt to “spur political action”. Thus, through a need to engage in
performative morality to fit into societal norms, affective agency may trigger some individuals
into genuinely empathizing with racially oppressed people.
However, to achieve this, societal norms must initially be shifted into considering racial
inequality as a worthy cause, which further indicates the inherently selfish nature of moral
performativity. Notably, Equiano’s eighteenth-century text functions to highlight the selfish
nature of contemporary virtue signaling, through recognizing the necessity of appealing to white
readers. As such, shifting social norms and mobilizing social justice movements seemingly
depends on appealing to audiences’ selfish hidden incentives to gain status, rather than genuine
interests in racial injustice. Thus, at the selfish core of virtue signaling, it seems possible that
some ignorant readers may mitigate or dismiss the depth of racial inequality, and therefore,
obstruct social progress. But ethical issues aside, the growing normalization of virtue signaling
may help to normalize social justice causes in the public eye, which may, in turn, inspire more

5

genuine affective responses among supporters. So, although appealing to selfish audience ideals
might seem counterproductive, it nevertheless creates avenues for publicly broadcasting moral
performativity. Consequently, social justice movements may acquire mass support, which will
both preserve an individual sense of belonging among supporters and may also gain enough
traction to acquire the genuine support of individuals who will act to advance social change. So,
as previously stated, appealing to virtue signalers seems to be initially necessary. This indicates
that anti-racist advocates have to configure their discussion in a way which appeals to primary
social concerns regarding moral prosperity which derives from conformity to socially accepted
ideologies. So, eighteenth-century abolitionist writers like Equiano needed to redefine socially
accepted norms through initially appealing to the centrality of European morality: their egoistic
desire to appear pious.
Through indulging European egoism, Equiano immediately avoids demonizing the slave
owners, as he gently states that he, “will not suppose that the dealers in slaves are born worse
than other men” (127), effectively disclaiming any possibility of attacking them. He further
amplifies this point when he states that it is “mistaken avarice that corrupts the milk of human
kindness” (127) indicating that greedy desires are to blame for corrupted morality. So, people
need to re-examine their priorities and choose to prioritize the values which engross morality,
rather than selfish greed. Thus, Equiano maintains an open-minded, yet firm position that holds
individuals accountable for upkeeping their own moral appearance. To further argue the
indisputable relevance of piety in eighteenth-century morality, he states that slave owners are
“raise[d] to a state of far above man” (127), as this reminds readers that Christians should be
humble servants of God, rather than enforcing their own perceived superiority over other people.
Thus, Equiano’s rational stance and appeal to European morality functions to humanize slaves
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and hold slave owners accountable for impious actions. While contemporary readers may not
commonly base their morality in religious values, affective piety remains relevant, as its purpose
is to use rational arguments to force readers into inhabiting the mental position of the oppressed
being. This encourages audiences to consider racial injustice and incentivises the need to reject
outward complacency with increasingly immoral notions surrounding racism, and instead, opt to
prove one’s moral superiority through supporting anti-racism.
In furthering this notion of inhabiting the position of the racially oppressed individual,
Equiano also presents relatable familial love to appeal primarily to individuals’ empathy, which
functions to render his unimaginable position, somewhat fathomable to non-Black readers. His
sublime recollection of love humanizes him through displaying a capacity for familial love, in
that it forces readers to recognize the relatable human qualities that Black people possess, and
therefore, encourages readers to acknowledge the immorality of racial discrimination.
Additionally, in A Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Scottish philosopher, Adam Smith
describes empathy as a type of imaginative projection. As Smith astutely notes, “we have no
immediate experience of what other men feel, [so] we can form no idea of the manner in which
they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (1).
Equiano establishes an affective connection with audiences by similarly encouraging the reader
to imaginatively project themselves into the position of the brother, as he reunites with his sister.
In the relatable notion of familial love within the sentimental reunion scene, audiences are
further encouraged to inhabit the overall emotional position of the oppressed slave. This
approach beneficially provides readers with the opportunity to personally engage with and
imaginatively react to unpleasant scenarios regarding the dehumanization and suffering of slaves,
particularly in this recollection of relatable familial love. This may subsequently trigger genuine
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emotions in readers, as, “to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow,
so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion” (Smith
2). So, in imaginatively experiencing the sufferings of oppressed individuals, audiences may
recognize the immorality of racial oppression, and develop a newfound sense of sympathy or
empathy. Either of which may advance audiences’ desire to engage in social justice movements
for the sake of selflessly pursing equality, or selfishly signaling their virtue publicly.
Nevertheless, through imaginative projection, people may gain insight into the state of the
oppressed individual, which might lead to substantial conversations surrounding topics of
inequality. It is, therefore, worth considering whether imaginative projection can function to
open avenues for redefining morality and social norms, whilst gaining support and
acknowledgment from a vast variety of people.
However, while audiences may connect to oppressed individuals through acts of imaginative
projection, white people’s imagination remains limited when it comes to inhabiting the
emotional position of the racially oppressed individual, for (as Smith suggests) our senses “never
did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can
form any conception of what are his sensation” (1). Additionally, as Tyrone Palmer argues, the
inability to involve oneself in the interiority of Black affective agency derives from the
inherently racist condition in which, “Black affective responses [which] are acknowledged…are
done so in a distorted manner, which functions to further reinforce the purported abnormality of
Black feeling” (14). So ultimately, the benefits of imaginative projection are limited, and Black
affect is rendered a sublime matter to white audiences, as Black affect is inaccessible to such
audiences who may misread and further appropriate Black affective agency by incessantly using
shallow motivations to be seen as engaging with anti-racist discourse.
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Thus, this lack of genuine understanding perpetuates complacency with structural racism as
Black people are dehumanized through alienating their affective agency as unfathomable.
Further, the “inability to conceive of Black emotion, to imagine the Black as a sentient being
with interiority, is rooted in the history of racial chattel slavery” (Palmer 17). This coincides with
the eighteenth-century abolitionist belief that Black people “possess[ed] inferior reasoning
powers and…dwell[ed] mostly in the realm of uncontrolled emotion” (Costanzo 24). As this
belief persistently contributes to the invalidation of Black accounts of injustice, the sublimity of
Black affect perpetuates white people’s imaginations as limited, as they cannot fathom racial
injustice on a personal level. Thus, they must be appealed to in relatable terms which can engage
one’s personal experiences with morals and affective agency. So, Equiano attempts to combat
the sublimity of Black affective agency as “he intends his testimonial to demonstrate the
humanity of the slave by revealing an interior self, and thereby to counter the racist assumption
that Africans lack the capacity for profound affective response” (Ahern 16). However, Equiano’s
efforts to humanize Black affective interiority might not always produce empathy within his
white readers. The sublimity of Black affect limits the white reader’s ability to imaginatively
project. Consequently, Equiano paradoxically encourages his readers to empathize with Black
familial affect, while simultaneously disconnecting affect from Blackness. To appeal to
European readers’ personal values and imaginative abilities regarding familial love, rather than
focusing on racial identity, Equiano simultaneously calls attention to Black affect, while
removing race, to create an affective setting in which white readers may easily relate to the
sentimental familial scene from a perspective of privilege. In this way, Equiano encourages the
European reader to develop a sense of understanding or empathy, despite the imaginative
limitations.
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Initially, the sublimity of Black affective agency is evident in the sibling reunion scene when
Equiano’s sister, “ran into [his] arms – [he] was quite overpowered: neither of [them] could
speak; but, for a considerable time, clung to each other in mutual embraces, unable to do any
thing but weep” (66). Evidently, their affective response to the sentimental reunion sublimely
results in an inability to articulate their emotions through speech, indicating the intensity and
potentially unfathomability of the event. However, Equiano quickly follows up in stating that
their “meeting affected all who saw [them]” (66), indicating the good nature and affective
understanding of the African slave owners. This may constructively motivate readers to prove
their own moral superiority by emulating the understanding actions of the slave owners and
humanizing the slaves enough to reconcile the relatability and humanness of Black affective
agency. Further, when Equiano recounts the subsequent separation from his sister, he balances
his sentimental experience with his rational narrative voice, as he manages to sensibly proclaim
the agony of being torn from his sister when he states, “happy should I have ever esteemed
myself to encounter every misery for you, and to procure your freedom by the sacrifice of my
own” (66). In this statement, he abstains from aggressively blaming slave owners or focusing
heavily on interior emotions beyond an obvious and understandable personal anguish. So, despite
the supposed sublimity of Black affect, Equiano balances his two narrative selves in order to
make his unfathomable position, somewhat fathomable to European readers who can identify
with being protective of their loved ones. Thus, by disconnecting affect from Blackness and by
imbedding it in a representation of non-racialized familial love, Equiano’s sentimental argument
gently coerces white readers into recognizing their own moral accountability, as well as
empathetically inhabiting the position of the unjustly shattered sibling relationship. This invites
audiences to acknowledge Black affective agency as existent and reasonable, if not relatable, and
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allows eighteenth-century and contemporary readers to indulge in the desire to exert public
displays of moral superiority regarding relevant racial injustice movements.
Similar to how the public showcasing of morality influenced the abolitionist movement of
the late eighteenth-century, contemporary social justice movements are emphasized by the
publicity of social media. Thus, contemporary people may feel pressured to imitate the vast
amount of anti-racist advocates on social media, and appeal to these normalized and prominent
morals through engaging in shallow virtue signaling. Substantially, it is unlikely that many
contemporary readers will view Equiano’s text with the same skepticism that racially ignorant
eighteenth-century readers initially would have. This is likely due to the current relevancy of
social media, which has allowed contemporary people to grow accustomed to demands for racial
justice, and to recognize the normalization of such morals. This indicates either that
contemporary people have evolved into more empathetic beings, or perhaps that virtue signaling
may be the successor of embellished morality surrounding eighteenth-century affective piety, in
that people throughout history may appropriate instances of racial injustice to enhance societal
representations of themselves. Thereby, virtue signaling may function to “incentivize moral
hypocrisy” among shallow audiences who are only “motivated to take actions designed to
maintain [an] impression” of moral goodness, which may consequently dismiss the depth of
racial injustice (Westra 12).
Despite this disturbing notion, virtue signaling also acts to normalize anti-racist discourse, as
people may “initially [commit] to a norm out of a desire for enhanced moral reputation, but
then…live up to this norm because their public moral expression has made them publicly
accountable” (Westra 14). So, audiences of abolitionism or modern social justice movements,
such as Black Lives Matter, are encouraged to appropriate egregious accounts of racial injustice
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as an opportunity to convince society that they are morally superior to those perpetuating racism,
and therefore, maintain a sense of responsibility in sustaining anti-racist discourse. On the other
hand, contemporary people may become complacent with the systemic nature of contemporary
racism by claiming that because slavery is over, we are automatically morally superior as a
society and, therefore, have nothing to prove. Crucially, as Palmer observes, such attitudes will
likely further “the nullification and denial of Black interiority and Black sentience…[and]
preclude the possibility of the Black as an affective agent” (18). Thus, as Equiano’s innovative
narrative suggests, the use of virtue signaling is a double-edged sword. While it may succeed in
redefining societal norms, it may also perpetuate shallowness, selfish posturing, and the
dismissal of Black affective agency. Overall, though, virtue signaling may provide hope that,
“the new social norm creates a psychological permission structure for…people to change their
moral beliefs” (Westra 22), which creates opportunity for a more genuine understanding of
racism and Black affective agency.
In conclusion, while racism in the eighteenth-century explicitly concerns the enslavement of
Black people, some privileged white readers may still argue that anti-Black racism and racial
inequality are no longer prevalent. However, the systemic nature of anti-Black racism continues
to plague the twenty-first-century, over two hundred years after the abolition of slavery. As such,
the feigned morality of eighteenth-century individuals finds its contemporary example in people
who overlook the seriousness of racial inequality, in favour of shallow virtue signaling.
Nonetheless, while some audiences may opt for shallow performances of morality (in which they
only temporarily support anti-racist action in the aftermath of extensively broadcasted racist hate
crimes), Equiano’s ability to construct arguments and combat negative biases surrounding Black
affect is a timeless endeavour which is useful in challenging and redefining moral social norms.
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While egoistic morality and virtue signaling may be performative in nature, such behaviour
perpetuates a necessary dialogue regarding racial inequality and subsequently, may persuade
generally unperturbed non-Black people to develop an interest in social justice as anti-racism
becomes increasingly normalized. Thus, despite the negative side effect of needing to appeal to
the egoistic goals of non-Black audiences to advance anti-racist discourse, “virtue signaling can
also be an invaluable instrument for social change” (Westra 22). So, moral performativity should
not simply be dismissed as inherently damaging to anti-racist causes, as these selfish incentives
present an opportunity to demolish ignorance through putting audiences in positions that force us
to develop a rational or empathetic understanding of Black affective agency and racial inequality.
3,171 words.
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